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Chapter 5

Measuring the extent of fiscal decentralisation:
An application to the United States

Yongzheng Liu, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Andrey Timofeev

The goal of this chapter is to develop a taxonomy of decentralisation measures and how they
are related to each other. In addition to introducing a common language for the different
strands of literature, this taxonomy is instrumental for studying the outcomes of
decentralisation. Using cross-state data from the United States, we show that aggregating
distinct dimensions of fiscal decentralisation into a single indicator inevitably leads to a loss
of information in the form of lower explanatory power. We conclude that the distinct aspects
of decentralisation should enter regression analyses separately, in the most flexible functional
form possible. In particular, we find that revenue autonomy is virtually orthogonal to the
subnational share of revenues and expenditures, suggesting that it carries additional
information. In this chapter we show also how the conventional measures of decentralisation
can be modified to account for the differing dependence on external grants.
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Introduction
For almost half a century, decentralisation of government has been approached from
different angles by scholars in different fields of social sciences: public finance, public
administration, and political science. This suggests that decentralisation, called rescaling
in some fields, is a multifaceted process. In particular, at least three different dimensions
jointly constitute this concept: the scope of authority, the degree of autonomy and the
direction of accountability.
Despite the multiplicity of approaches, it appears that various definitions of
decentralisation have as the common denominator the notion of transferring “power,
resources, and authority” away from the central government (Schneider, 2003, p. 33). The
literature however differs in the measurements of the kinds of power and resources
transferred and the recipients of this power and resources. Essentially what is transferred
can be classified into fiscal matters, such as the power to tax and spend, and non-fiscal
matters, including autonomy and accountability. Concerning the recipients of the
transferred powers and resources, the literature can be generally broken down into two
categories: 1) traditional state/regional and local authorities, and 2) other cases, such as
semi-autonomous government agencies, as in the case of New Public Management, or
non-government entities, such as community schools, for-profit providers and so on.
The case of decentralisation to traditional local authorities has been discussed and
measured in the literature along the three main dimensions: fiscal, political and
administrative (e.g. Schneider, 2003). Going back to Philip (1954), the public finance
literature commonly merges political and administrative aspects under one category
labelled as the “regulation powers” while splitting the fiscal aspect into the powers of
financing and delivery of public services.
Very recently, Blume and Voigt (2011) attempted to condense through factor analysis
25 commonly used indicators of decentralisation and federalism, including political,
fiscal and administrative aspects (with the number of countries varying from 33 to 136
depending on the variable). When applying the Kaiser rule to drop all factors with
eigenvalues under 1.0, their factor analysis suggests that the information captured by
these indicators can be condensed to a dataset of seven dimensions, accounting for 70%
of the variation in the original variables. Furthermore, the scree plot of the eigenvalues
appears to level off after the fourth dimension, indicating that each additional dimension
adds little marginal difference in the variance explained. These four leading dimensions,
accounting for half of all variation in the dataset are: 1) election of local executives;
2) share of public resources raised/spent locally; 3) transfer dependence; 4) and election
of local councils. The other three dimensions jointly explain an additional 20% of the
variation in the original variables. These three other factors capture unconditional sharing
of national tax revenue, veto power of the house of regional representatives and political
fragmentation in the parliament.
One has to note that the reduction of dimensionality achieved through factor analysis
does not imply that conceptually all aspects of decentralisation can be defined in terms of
those seven principal components. Rather, the results mean that, in this cross-country
sample, various manifestations of decentralisation would appear to be driven by these
seven forces, which Blume and Voigt (2011) call “latent variables”. However, this
regularity might not hold in other contexts.
This taxonomy of decentralisation dimensions does more than just introduce a
common language for the parallel discussions in different strands of literature. It is
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believed to be instrumental for measuring and studying the outcomes of decentralisation.
Thus almost a decade ago this was eloquently stated by Schneider (2003, p. 35):
If there are multiple dimensions, then decentralisation along one
dimension could be related to one set of causes and effects, and
decentralisation along another dimension could relate to a different or
opposite set of causes and effects. Alternatively, decentralisation along one
dimension could interact or combine with decentralisation along another
dimension (to produce outcomes). Researchers who do not explicitly look
at each dimension or haphazardly aggregate dimensions will mismeasure
the type and degree of decentralisation and draw incorrect inferences about
the relationship between decentralisation and other phenomena.
Both theoretical and empirical studies have identified specific instances of lumping
opposite sets of causes and effects under one decentralisation measure. Thus, the
commonly used share of subnational expenditures lumps together in one explanatory
variable two opposite effects: 1) that of tax competition resulting from revenue
decentralisation and 2) that of over-fishing of the common revenue pool resulting from
grant-financed expenditure decentralisation (Rodden, 2003). On the empirical side,
Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés (2011) find that fiscal decentralisation is positively correlated
with governance quality, as measured by the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators,
while different measures of political decentralisation (such as regional elections or
bicameralism) are negatively correlated with the governance quality.
The common caveat in the empirical studies of decentralisation is that regulation,
while being the most common form of government power, cannot be measured by any
indicator constructed from fiscal data.1 However, even setting aside the regulation aspect,
using cross-country data from IMF’s GFS, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010) point
out the importance of separately measuring different aspects of fiscal decentralisation.
They show that aggregating distinct dimensions of fiscal decentralisation into a single
indicator inevitably leads to a loss of information in the form of lower explanatory power.
They conclude that in a multivariate framework the distinct aspects of decentralisation
should enter regression analyses separately, in the most flexible functional form possible.
In particular, they find that revenue autonomy is virtually orthogonal to the sub-national
share of revenues and expenditure, suggesting that it carries information complementary
to that contained in the decentralisation ratios. Similarly in their cross-country study,
Blume and Voigt (2011) find that revenue autonomy is uncorrelated not only with the
revenue and expenditure shares but also with political aspects, such as local elections.
They come to a similar conclusion that “finer-grained indicators should aim at keeping
conceptually separate the different dimensions of federalism.”
This chapter aims to further corroborate these findings by showing the validity of
these points in a completely different context: decentralisation within the US states. In
addition, we suggest how the traditional measures of decentralisation can be modified to
account for an additional aspect of decentralisation, namely the dependence on grants
external to the state-local relations.
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Dimensions of state-local decentralisation in the United States
Existing measures of fiscal decentralisation essentially boil down to a few core
concepts: locally raised revenues, locally decided expenditure, locally spent
intergovernmental grants, and the number and relative size of local government units. To
visualise the essence of specific measures and the relationship among them, we use the
tabular representation suggested by Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010). In Table 5.1
we apply this tabular visualisation to state-local finances in Georgia, USA. With this
table, the structure of the total state-local finances in Georgia can be analysed, on the one
hand, by the level of government generating public revenues (horizontal axis) and, on the
other hand, by the level of government spending these resources (vertical axis).
The combination of three sources (federal, state and local) and two uses (state and
local) breaks the total state-local finances into six parts or quadrants. For example,
Table 5.1 shows that in the state of Georgia, 40% of total state-local expenditures fall into
the most decentralised category of being both locally financed and locally administered
(Quadrant VI). At the same time 39% of total state-local expenditure fall into the most
centralised category of being both centrally financed and centrally administered
(Quadrants I-II). An additional 21% represents an intermediate case of expenditure,
which are locally administered but centrally financed (Quadrants IV-V).
Table 5.1. Relative authority of different levels of government over total state-local finances
in Georgia, USA, 2002

Federally financed
21%

Expenditure
responsibilities

Revenue-raising authority
State financed
Locally financed
39%
40%

State
administered
39%

(Quadrant I)

(Quadrant II)

(Quadrant III)

19%

20%

<0.2%

Locally
administered
61%

(Quadrant IV)

(Quadrant V)

(Quadrant VI)

2%

19%

40%

Note: Over one fifth of local own revenue derives from piggybacking on state sales and excise taxes.
Source: Prepared by authors based on data from the Bureau of Census.

Because the shares of the six quadrants in the total add up to one, it suffices to know
only five out of the six numbers to have a complete picture of the composition. Moreover,
in states where state governments do not receive grants from local authorities, only four
numbers are required to describe the vertical break-down of public finances (as
Quadrant III is empty). Obviously, no single indicator among those used in the literature
can relay all the information that requires four separate numbers to describe. Indeed, the
expenditure ratio captures the combined share of grant-financed (Quadrants IV-V) and
self-financed (Quadrant VI) expenditure by local governments but conveys no
information on the size of these two parts relative to each other. This limitation is easily
identifiable in each of the measures used in empirical decentralisation literature as
summarised in Table 5.2.
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Furthermore, given the insignificant share of federal transfers by-passing states and
flowing directly to local authorities (on average 4% of state-local finances across all
states), Quadrant IV could be also ignored, thus requiring only three numbers to describe
state-local decentralisation. Indeed, as summarised in Table 5.2, any single indicator
among those used in the literature, can be expressed as a rational function of the
expenditure ratio (ER), revenue ratio (RR) and the share of federal grants in the
state-local finances, DF=I +IV:
CR= (1-DF)*RR/ (1-ER),
RA= (1-DF)*RR/ER, and
VI=1-RA.
Table 5.2. Informational limitations of different decentralisation measures used in the literature
Measure
Expenditure ratio (ER)

Graphical representation
IV+V+VI

Revenue ratio (RR)
Average ratio (AR)
Revenue autonomy (RA)
Vertical imbalance (VI)
Composite ratio (CR)

(III +VI)/(QIII+VI+ II +V)
(ER+RR)/2
(III+ VI)/ (IV+V+VI)
(IV+V – III)/ (IV+V+VI)
VI/(I + II)

Application
Oates (1972), Woller and Phillips (1998), Zhang and Zou
(1998), Davoodi and Zou (1998), Akai and Sakata (2002)
Oates (1972), Akai and Sakata (2002)
Akai and Sakata (2002)
Akai and Sakata (2002),Habibi et al. (2003)
DeMello (2000), Ebel and Yilmaz (2002)
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010)

Note: Capital roman figures denote the share of each quadrant in the total state-local public finances.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

It has to be acknowledged that the sufficiency of the three indicators stems from
neglecting differences in local discretion when it comes to levying different local taxes
and spending at the local level. In particular, Quadrant VI lumps together revenue from
sources over which local governments have almost complete control, such as property
taxes, with piggybacks on the state taxes, such a local option sales tax (LOST), often
earmarked for specific local or area projects. In the state of Georgia, the LOST revenue
accounts for 21% of local own-source revenue compared to one third accounted for by
property taxes.
Besides the shares of different levels of government in total public revenues and
expenditure, some empirical studies have also measured decentralisation by the number
and average size of jurisdictions at each level.2 Furthermore, when there are several tiers
of local government, the territorial fragmentation of different tiers is weighted by their
relative roles in the public finance (Breton and Scott, 1978).3 To capture the
fragmentation of different types of local authorities in the United States, we follow the
approach of Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010), which is essentially Breton and
Scott’s indicator but without the normalisation by population or land area. The second
modification of Breton and Scott’s indicator is that different tiers of government are also
weighted according to their role in generating public revenues (the R-Scale indicator) as
an alternative to weighing according to their role in spending public resources (the
E-Scale indicator). Below we illustrate the computation of the scale indicators using the
example of the state of Georgia.
Formula: R-Scale = {[State government revenue] + [general purpose authorities’
revenue]/# of general purpose authorities + [special purpose districts’ revenue]/# of
special purpose districts}/ State-local revenue.4
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Example: R-Scale measure in the state of Georgia
1 jurisdiction at the state scale

State government revenue share = 42%

693 general purpose jurisdictions at the local tier

General purpose jurisdictions’ revenue share = 24%

604 special purpose jurisdictions at the local tier

Special purpose jurisdictions’ revenue share = 34%

R-scale = 0.42+ 0.24/693 + 0.34/604 =0.424.

Single indicator
As remarked above, a single decentralisation ratio is unlikely to capture the entirety
of powers assigned to the sub-national level. This is because different aspects of
government activities (regulation, financing, and delivery) cannot be captured with the
same indicator. This has been previously pointed out in the literature, for example by
Schneider (2003, p. 42): “No single indicator can capture the decentralisation concept
fully, and no simple combination of indicators, such as an average or an index, can
capture the multidimensionality of the concept.”
However, sometimes a single indicator is needed that would at a glance show us a
general trend in fiscal decentralisation, and also reveal relationships to other variables, in
either a tabular or graphical form. While no single indicator can capture all aspects of
decentralisation, some indicators might be more inclusive and informative than others.
Thus, some indicators can be affected by and therefore carry information about other
indicators but not the other way around. This can make some indicators more informative
than others. For example, taxing authority usually requires political legitimacy for the
local government in the form of being locally elected. Therefore, larger taxing powers can
signal larger political autonomy. By contrast, having local elections does not necessarily
require taxing powers as it is not unheard of that elected local councils being kept on a
short leash by the national authorities by making them entirely dependent on the revenue
transferred from the central government. Similarly, higher revenue-raising powers are
usually necessitated by higher expenditure responsibilities and can therefore signal this
feature. By contrast there are countries where local governments are responsible for major
expenditure items, such as education and healthcare, without raising any significant
amount of revenue locally.
While it would be impossible to capture a multi-dimensional process of
decentralisation with a single indicator, we nevertheless can attempt to measure more
than just one aspect, that is not only revenue or expenditure based. Thus, out of the
various decentralisation measures summarised in Table 5.2, AR and CR can be expected
to contain information on both revenues and expenditure, as both AR and CR are rational
functions of the ER and RR indicators. However, collapsing the multi-dimensional fiscal
space into a scalar indicator requires judgment (weighting) regarding the relative
importance of different aspects of decentralisation. Furthermore, choosing specific
– implicit or explicit weights – is not just about quantification. If there is a positive
“progress” along all dimensions of decentralisation, we can confidently call it an increase
in decentralisation and that would be reflected in higher values of the AR and CR
indicators. But what if we have a significant increase in grant-financed local expenditure
with a slight reduction of locally-generated revenues? Depending on how we weight these
changes relative to each other, we might have an aggregate measure to show either an
increase in the decentralisation or a decrease, that is qualitatively different assessments.
MEASURING FISCAL DECENTRALISATION © OECD, KIPF 2013

5. MEASURING THE EXTENT OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION: AN APPLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES – 77

Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the aggregate indicators (AR and CR) are still
more informative than either ER or RR alone. Indeed, devolving responsibility for only
the administration of some services but not for their financing will raise CR by decreasing
its denominator.5 However, devolving the responsibility for both administration and
financing of this service will both decrease the denominator and increase the numerator of
CR thus resulting in a larger increase in the ratio than in the first case. Thus, the CR
indicator weights more heavily comprehensive decentralisation than just the
decentralisation of administration. The same holds for the AR indicator.

Empirical evidence on the relative performance of the decentralisation measures for
the state-local finances in the United States
In the previous discussion, we have pointed out conceptual differences among various
decentralisation indicators in terms of the scope of various dimensions of decentralisation
that they capture. However, in practice, the importance of these conceptual differences
will depend on the extent of divergence in the progress along various dimensions of
decentralisation. Thus, when we have uniform progress along all dimensions of
decentralisation, then expenditure decentralisation will be the same as revenue
decentralisation and both decentralisation ratios will be telling us the same information
while the revenue autonomy indicator would not give any information because it would
be always equal to one minus the share of federal grants in the state-local finances
(1-DF).
Further to the point, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010) report that, using the
scale indicators (R-scale and E-scale) on the IMF’s GFS data adds little additional
information on top of that relayed by the decentralisation ratios as the two scale indicators
are almost perfectly inversely correlated with the corresponding decentralisation ratios
used in their construction. This suggests that the territorial fragmentation does not
develop independently from the fiscal ratios, at least in the countries included in the GFS
dataset.6
Therefore, we examine next in this chapter differences in the actual behaviour of the
seven decentralisation indicators in relationship to each other and in statistical association
with some variables of interest:
1.

Expenditure ratio (ER)

2.

Revenue ratio (RR)

3.

Average ratio (AR)

4.

Composite ratio (CR)

5.

Revenue autonomy (RA)

6.

E-scale

7.

R-scale

We start by summarising the relationships among these indicators in a visual form by
means of a biplot. The biplot display is a commonly used multivariate method for
graphing row and column elements (in this case, states and their decentralisation
indicators correspondingly) using a single display (Gabriel, 1971). The rays originating
from the centre of the graph are linear projections of the seven indicators onto the
MEASURING FISCAL DECENTRALISATION © OECD, KIPF 2013
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two-dimensional subspace where most variability occurs in the original multidimensional
dataset, capturing almost 95% of total variation in our case.7
The principal component biplot is a powerful tool that allows us to capture the
relationship between the different indicators. Variable rays representing uncorrelated
indicators are orthogonal. The smaller the inner angle between rays, the higher is the
positive correlation between the values of the corresponding indicators. For negatively
correlated variables, the inner angle is greater than 90o. Because biplot is a
two-dimensional projection of a multi-dimensional space, it deforms the relative
configurations among objects depending on the angle of projection. We use the projection
aspect that preserves angles among indicators but not necessarily distances among states.
Similar to the cross-country findings by Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010), we
also observe that the R-scale indicator is almost perfectly inversely correlated with the
corresponding ratio (RR) used in its construction to weigh the government tiers. This
suggests that the territorial aspect of decentralisation (territorial fragmentation) does not
develop independently from the revenue decentralisation within the US states. However,
the negative correlation between the E-scale and ER is strictly less than unity thus
suggesting that, unlike revenue raising powers, the assignment of expenditure
responsibilities to local authorities might be unrelated to the extent of their fragmentation.
We also find that the two aggregate measures (AR and CR) are almost perfectly and
positively correlated, which is not surprising given that they are constructed from the
same ingredients (ER and RR) but using different functional forms.

3

Figure 5.1. Principal component biplot for decentralisation indicators in the United States in 1992
State

Variables

2

RA

1

Dimension 2

NH
HI

RR

RI
E_scale

0

AK

DE
R_scale

TN
MD

SD
OR MI NE

VT

KS
CO
VA
NJ IL
NY
MT PA
TX
MA
MO
GA
ND
IA OH
ME
SC
FL
AZ
IN WY
NC
LA
WI
UT
AL
MN
OK MS
AR
NV
ID
WA
CA
KY
WV
CT

-1

NM

-2

-1

AR
CR

ER

0

1

2

Dimension 1

Source: Prepared by the authors based on data from the Census of Government.

The Revenue autonomy indicator has clear relationships with the Revenue ratio
(positive) and the Expenditure ratio (negative). This latter negative association conforms
to the prediction by Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010), which was derived under
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the assumption that the elasticity of the revenue ratio measure with respect to the
expenditure ratio measure is less than one.8 This possibility that two dimensions of the
same decentralisation process can move in opposite directions might partially explain the
inconsistencies in the findings of existing studies of decentralisation outcomes. It also
poses challenges for meta-analyses of those studies, such as the recent one by Feld et al.
(2010), comparing estimates of the impact on growth obtained in studies using
inconsistent measures of decentralisation, including the expenditure ratio and revenue
autonomy indicator.
As a robustness check, in Table 5.3 below we report coefficients of pair-wise
correlations between our seven indicators. The relationships uncovered by examining the
projections of those variables on the two-dimensional biplot space for the most part
accord with the values of correlation coefficients. The slight differences are due to the
biplot approximation as the rank of our dataset is more than two.
The individual points on the biplot chart are linear projections of our observations
labelled with corresponding state codes. Because the variables are normalised by
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, data points located in the
centre of the graph represent US states with average values of the decentralisation
indicators. Data points located away from the centre in the direction of some variable ray
represent states with values of that variable that are distinct from the average.
Table 5.3. Coefficients of pair-wise correlation
ER

RR

AR

CR

RA

E-scale

R-scale

ER

1.00

0.72

0.95

0.84

-0.36

-0.91

-0.73

RR

0.72

1.00

0.90

0.74

0.34

-0.85

-1.00

AR

0.95

0.90

1.00

0.86

-0.07

-0.95

-0.91

CR

0.84

0.74

0.86

1.00

-0.03

-0.80

-0.73

RA

-0.36

0.34

-0.07

-0.03

1.00

0.09

-0.30

E-scale

-0.91

-0.85

-0.95

-0.80

0.09

1.00

0.87

R-scale

-0.73

-1.00

-0.91

-0.73

-0.30

0.87

1.00

Source: Authors’ calculations.

As one can see from the biplot graph, New Hampshire is the outmost outlier in the
positive direction along the revenue autonomy ray, while Washington state is the outmost
outlier in the negative direction. A few states stand out in the direction of the fiscal ratios:
Florida having the largest share of sub-national revenues and expenditure while Hawaii
having the smallest sub-national shares but at the same time among the highest values of
the revenue autonomy indicator.
Next we examine how much information is lost in practice by i) using a single
indicator rather than several, or ii) one single indicator rather than another single
indicator.
This empirical exercise aims to compare the explanatory power of alternative
decentralisation indicators in terms of the share of variation in the outcome variable
explained by the given indicator(s), known as the R-squared. In computing the R-squared,
we do not include any additional regressors, i.e. we are running a univariate regression.
MEASURING FISCAL DECENTRALISATION © OECD, KIPF 2013
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Although additional regressors could explain more variation in the outcome variable, this
additional explanatory power would be due to the regressors other than the
decentralisation measures we are trying to compare. Being just a squared coefficient of
correlation, the R-squared captures the strength of statistical association between
decentralisation and the variable of interest but it does not imply causality; in fact, the
coefficient of correlation might represent the effect of that socio-economic variable on
decentralisation. This suits our purpose because we are interested in evaluating the ability
of alternative indicators to capture information about decentralisation regardless of
whether it is used on the left-hand side or the right-hand side of a regression equation.
Table 5.4 provides some evidence on the explanatory power of different indicators of
fiscal decentralisation for five socio-economic outcomes in the US states:9
•

real per capita income growth

•

real per capita GDP growth

•

employment growth

•

population growth

•

government size

For each of the outcome variables, we report the share of total variation explained by
the pair of indicators corresponding to the respective column and row, while adjusting for
the number of explanatory variables employed (adjusted R-squared). In the diagonal cells,
where the row and the column represent the same indicator, we report the share of total
variation explained by that single indicator (the squared coefficient of its correlation to
the outcome variable). The decentralisation indicators are for 1992 while the values for
the outcome variables are averaged over 1992-96, following Akai and Sakata (2002).
While lagging the fiscal indicators can help capture causality, we do not claim any causal
link but rather discuss the strength of a statistical association. This is because our
discussion of measuring decentralisation equally applies whether decentralisation is
measured as a dependent or independent variable.
The explanatory power of each pair of decentralisation indicators varies among the
outcome variables and overall is higher for personal income growth and lower for
employment growth. While for any pair of decentralisation indicators the explained share
of variation in the outcome variables is smaller than the joint explanatory power of all
seven indicators, according to an adjusted R-squared, the loss of explanatory power is
considerable only for the government size regression.
Even after adjusting for the number of regressors, there is a substantial difference in
explanatory power between the best performing pair of indicators and either of the two
individual single indicators, or the best performing single indicator for that matter. It also
comes as little surprise that no single indicator performs well for all outcome variables.
The expenditure ratio performs best for employment growth. The revenue ratio performs
best in the government size regression. The average ratio is the best performer for GDP
growth and personal income growth. The composite ratio is the best performer for
population growth. As a standalone indicator, revenue autonomy has almost no
explanatory power.
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Table 5.4. Explanatory power of a pair of decentralisation indicators (adjusted R-Squared)
ER
RR
ER
0.236
RR
0.28
0.272
AR
0.28
0.28
CR
0.239
0.273
RA
0.243
0.31
E-Scale
0.231
0.271
R-scale
0.24
0.347
Variation explained by all seven indicators: 0.380
ER
RR
ER
0.251
RR
0.241
0.175
AR
0.243
0.246
CR
0.29
0.157
RA
0.235
0.275
E-Scale
0.263
0.157
R-scale
0.236
0.191
Variation explained by all seven indicators: 0.341
ER
RR
ER
0.23
RR
0.222
0.0792
AR
0.22
0.226
CR
0.213
0.177
RA
0.223
0.219
E-Scale
0.247
0.0924
R-scale
0.221
0.0661
Variation explained by all seven indicators: 0.216
ER
RR
ER
0.0835
RR
0.0987
-0.00586
AR
0.0936
0.105
CR
0.107
0.264
RA
0.0766
0.0483
E-Scale
0.0642
0.114
R-scale
0.0774
-0.0142
Variation explained by all seven indicators: 0.242
ER
RR
ER
0.0688
RR
0.122
0.14
AR
0.13
0.122
CR
0.0512
0.155
RA
0.0785
0.128
E-Scale
0.0779
0.216
R-scale
0.0715
0.221
Variation explained by all seven indicators: 0.334

AR

Real per capita income growth
CR
RA

E-Scale

R-scale

0.143
0.17

0.187

0.286
0.411
0.271
0.376
0.273

0.14
0.122
0.127
0.17

AR

Real per capita GDP growth
CR

RA

E-Scale

R-scale

0.255
0.38
0.257
0.324
0.257

0.119
0.129
0.113
0.117

0.0105
0.146
0.239

0.131
0.123

0.128

AR

Employment growth
CR

RA

E-Scale

R-scale

0.189
0.173
0.225
0.206
0.216

0.178
0.228
0.21
0.192

0.0517
0.168
0.218

0.111
0.0943

0.0624

AR

Population growth
CR

RA

E-Scale

R-scale

0.0485
0.188
0.0669
0.0472
0.0547

0.123
0.148
0.163
0.224

0.0262
0.0949
0.0692

0.0659
0.0893

AR

Government size
CR

RA

E-Scale

R-scale

0.0155
0.0837

0.079

0.113
0.177
0.102
0.282
0.0939

0.0423
0.0257
0.0532
0.0606

-0.0194
0.127
0.225

-0.0179
-0.0026
0.065

0.000367

Note: Dependent variables are in levels, 1992-1996 average; independent variables are in logs, 1992.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

We also attempted to take into consideration the fact that, unlike in the cross-country
setup of Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2010), for state-local finances a pair of
indicators might not perform that well because federal grants introduce an additional,
third dimension. To address this, we repeated this empirical exercise as a second step of a
partitioned regression on three decentralisation indicators. More specifically, in the first
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step we regressed all variables on the share of federal grants in state-local finances. Then
in the second step, we replicated regressions reported in Table 5.4 but this time replacing
each variable with the residuals from regressing that variable on the federal dependence
in the first-step regression. This produced results that are qualitatively very similar to
those reported in Table 5.4.

Conclusions
This chapter corroborates previous findings from cross-country studies, showing that
aggregating distinct dimensions of decentralisation into a single indicator inevitably leads
to a loss of information in the form of lower explanatory power. Because the validity of
this point has been shown in a completely different context from that of the previous
studies, it should leave no doubt that the distinctions among the dimensions of
decentralisation are not just theoretical hair-splitting but have real implications for
applied studies.
Previous studies did not take into account how grants to the central budget from
foreign and sub-national entities might affect the decentralisation indicators constructed
from cross-country data. This could lead to incomparable measures of decentralisation in
poor developing countries, where a significant share of international assistance can be in
the form of central government budget support grants. In this chapter, we show how the
traditional measures of decentralisation can be modified to account for the dependence on
grants external to the state-local relations in the United States. This approach can be also
applied to the case of foreign grants in a cross-country context.
The main message of this chapter is that there is no single best measure of fiscal
decentralisation. This reinforces earlier calls for distinct aspects of decentralisation to
enter regression analyses separately, in the most flexible functional form possible.10 Even
when we include measures of various decentralisation aspects as separate regressors, we
effectively assign relative weights (given by the regression coefficients). However, in this
case the weights are less arbitrary than in a composite measure, as they are determined by
the relative impacts of the decentralisation aspects on the specific dependent variable.
One problem with regression-derived weights is that, if different aspects of
decentralisation have a common driver (e.g., more fragmented local governments might
have less taxing powers), then the regression might fail to clearly attribute the impact to
separate decentralisation indicators, thus resulting in statistically insignificant weights
(estimated coefficients). A composite indicator would not have such a problem as it
assigns predetermined (arbitrary) weights as a result of the chosen functional form for the
formula used to compute the decentralisation measure. However, these arbitrary weights
do not reflect the relevance of different aspects of decentralisation for the outcome that is
being studied. Therefore, a composite variable might perform well for one outcome but
not so well for some other outcome variable. By contrast, including disaggregated
indicators in the regression would assign weights specific to that particular causal
relationship.
To avoid the problem of multi-collinearity without resorting to arbitrary weights, one
can reduce the dimensionality of a set of decentralisation measures by way of factor
analysis, as in Blume and Voigt (2011), and then use the resulting principal components
as explanatory variables in the regression analysis. However, the interpretation of the
principal components may not always be transparent or even intuitive.
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Finally, explanatory variables should include both fiscal and non-fiscal variables.
Thus, in addition to measuring both fiscal importance and fiscal autonomy of sub-national
governments, any study of economic outcomes should also control for other institutional
arrangements such as: territorial structure of sub-national jurisdictions, political
arrangements including legal status of local authorities, clarity in the delineation of
powers among levels of government, or sub-national borrowing powers and financial
infrastructure. Voigt and Blume (2010) find that fiscal performance and government
efficiency outcomes are strongly affected by a number of non-fiscal dimensions of
decentralisation: electing municipal governments locally, empowering states to veto at
least some federal-level legislation and the political fragmentation of parliament in terms
of the heterogeneity of interests.

Notes
1.

Indirectly, however, fiscal data can capture the relative roles of different tiers of
government in regulation. To the extent that regulation requires manpower to
prescribe and enforce regulatory norms, the relative share of local governments in
total public administration expenditure or in the total civil service of a country should
reflect the role of local government in regulation. Concerning the regulation of local
government services, the extent of funding mandated by the national government can
be measured by the share of conditional grants in local government revenue (Levin,
1991).

2.

See, for example, Oates (1985), Nelson (1986) and Eberts and Gronberg (1990).

3.

Breton and Scott’s indicator is computed as the average size (population-wise or
land-wise) of the different tiers of government weighted according to the shares of
those tiers in total public expenditure. However, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev
(2010) argue that population and land area should play a more flexible role and enter
them as separate explanatory variables and instead use the inverse of the number of
jurisdictions.

4.

General purpose authorities include county, municipal and township governments,
while special purpose districts include independent school districts and special
districts.

5.

In states where all local government expenditure are financed by the state
government, the CR indicator of decentralisation would be insensitive to changes in
the amount of these centrally financed expenditures. This might be a good quality of a
decentralisation indicator, as a lack of any source of marginal revenue for local
governments makes reaping the benefits of decentralisation less feasible.

6.

It can be shown that, when territorial fragmentation and decentralisation ratios are
independent from each other, the negative correlation between a scale indicator and
the corresponding decentralisation ratio is strictly less than unity. Moreover, the
higher is the variation in territorial fragmentation relative to the variation in the
decentralisation ratio, the weaker is this negative correlation between the scale
indicator and the corresponding decentralisation ratio. For proof see Annex 5.A1.
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7.

Somewhat similar to the R-squared in the case of a regression, the goodness of fit of a
biplot is defined as the fraction of the sum of squares of singular values accounted for
by the two largest singular values of the dataset.

8.

In our dataset the elasticity of the revenue ratio measure with respect to the
expenditure ratio measure is 0.72.

9.

We chose this set of outcome variables because they were used previously in studies
of state-local decentralisation in the United States (see, for example, Xie et al., 1999;
Akai and Sakata, 2002; Stansel, 2005; Akai et al., 2009; and Hammond and
Tosun, 2011). The list of variables and data sources and descriptive statistics are
presented in Annex 5.A1, Tables 5.A1 and 5.A2, respectively.

10.

For example, Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model
to simultaneously determine relative weights of different decentralisation aspects in a
composite measure for China and to estimate the impact of this synthesised
decentralisation measure on the country’s economic growth and inflation.
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Annex 5.A1

Lemma: If territorial fragmentation and decentralisation ratios are independent from each
other, the negative correlation between a scale indicator and the corresponding
decentralisation ratio is strictly less than unity.

Proof:
Let us consider a simplified case of a two-tier government: central and local.
Let R stand for a decentralisation ratio (revenue or expenditure). Then a related scale
measure can be expressed as following:
S= (1-R) +R/#,
where # is the number of local government units
Let’s denote (1/#-1) as G, then
S=1+R*G
Recalling that VAR [X] =E[X2]-E2[X] and COV[X, Y] =E[X*Y]-E[X] *E[Y], we
express the correlation between R and S as

cov[ R, S ]
VAR[ R ] VAR[ S ]

=

E [R S ]  E [R ] E [S ]

[ ]

E R 2  E 2 [R ]

[ ]

E S 2  E 2 [S ] .

If R and G are independent, then
E[R*S] = E[R] +E [R2] * E [G], and
E[S] = 1+E[R]* E [G],
E [S2]-E2[S] =E [R2] * E [G2]-E2[R]*E2 [G],
Substituting these into the correlation formula yields

[ ] E[G ]  E[R ]  E [R ] E [G ] = E [G ]
E [R ]  E [R ]
E [R ] E [G ]  E [R ] E [G ]
E [R ] + E R 2
2

2

2

2

2

2

Now recall the law of total variance:
VAR[X] =E [VAR [X|Y]] +VAR [E [X|Y]].
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VAR[ R ]
VAR[ R G ]

.
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If R and G are independent, then VAR [G |R] =VAR [G] and E [G |R] =E [G], which
yields
VAR[R*G] =E [VAR[R*G |R]] +VAR [E[R*G |R]] =E [R2]*VAR [G] +VAR[R]*E2
[G].
Substituting this into the correlation formula yields

E[G ]

VAR[ R]
E 2 [G ] VAR[ R]
=
=
VAR[ R G]
E[R 2 ] * VAR[G ] + VAR[R] * E 2 [G]

1
2

E[R ] * VAR[G ]
+1
E 2 [G ] VAR[ R]

This is because E [G] <0.
It is clear that the latter expression is negative and less than unity in absolute value unless
VAR [G] =0.
Moreover, the higher is the variation in territorial fragmentation relative to the
variation in decentralisation ratios, the weaker is this negative correlation between the
scale indicators and corresponding decentralisation ratios.
Table 5.A1. Variables description and sources
Variable
incpc_gr
gdppc_gr
emp_gr
pop_gr
gov_siz

Description
Real per capita income growth rate
Real per capita GDP growth rate (chained 2005 dollars)
Employment growth rate
Population growth rate
Government size, defined as the share of total state and local tax revenues in
personal income

Source
U.S.Census
U.S.Census
U.S.Census
U.S.Census
U.S.Census

Source: Authors’ calculations.

Table 5.A2. Variables descriptive statistics
Variable
incpc_gr
gdppc_gr
emp_gr
pop_gr
gov_siz

Obs
50
50
50
50
50

Mean
0.016
0.025
0.022
0.014
0.116

Std. Dev.
0.007
0.012
0.012
0.010
0.014

Min
-0.007
-0.014
-0.003
0.002
0.095

Max
0.028
0.051
0.059
0.052
0.181

Source: Authors’ calculations.
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